Cobalt. The Battery Metal the West Doesn’t Control

Cobalt has tripled in price since early 2025. The people building battery supply chains in the US and Europe should be paying close attention , not because of the price move itself, but because of what caused it, and what it reveals about who actually controls this market.

The trigger was an export ban imposed by the Democratic Republic of Congo in February 2025 , a response to a price collapse that had driven cobalt to near nine-year lows — which choked off feedstock flows and sent prices from roughly $21,000 per tonne to over $56,000 by mid-2026. The ban was lifted in October 2025 and replaced with an annual quota system, but the supply shock had already repriced the market. The deeper story is that a single country, one ranked among the world’s most fragile states supplies 76% of global cobalt production, and that Chinese companies hold ownership stakes in 15 of the largest copper and cobalt mines in the DRC. The West has known this for years. The policy response has been sluggish. Now the bill is arriving.

A Supply Chain Built on a Single Point of Failure

The cobalt market has no analogue in the critical minerals landscape for concentration risk. Not lithium. Not nickel. Not even rare earths, where China dominates processing but production is more geographically distributed. Cobalt’s primary supply is existentially dependent on the DRC, and the DRC’s cobalt sector is, in turn, existentially dependent on Chinese capital.

The mechanism of that dependence deserves to be understood precisely. The Sino-Congolais des Mines (Sicomines) agreement, signed in 2007, gave Chinese firms mining rights to deposits near Kolwezi valued at approximately $93 billion in exchange for infrastructure commitments worth $3 billion. That arrangement seeded the ownership structure that now shapes the entire global cobalt market. Chinese companies have built on it steadily, and China now refines approximately 70% of the world’s cobalt, regardless of where the ore originates. The West extracts some of the ore. China processes almost all of it.

The EV boom accelerated demand before any serious diversification of supply could take place. Cobalt consumption for battery applications alone is projected to exceed 300,000 metric tonnes annually by 2030 — roughly double 2022 levels. The primary supply response, constrained by mine development timelines measured in decades and by geopolitical arrangements measured in decades more, cannot keep pace. That is the structural problem recycling is now being asked to solve, at least in part.

The Recycling Value Chain: How Secondary Cobalt Actually Moves

Understanding where the recycling opportunity sits requires understanding how the value chain actually functions — because it is considerably more complex than the equivalent for copper or aluminium scrap.

The chain begins with collection and aggregation: end-of-life EV battery packs, consumer electronics, manufacturing scrap from cell production, and increasingly, batteries from early EV fleets now reaching end-of-life. The logistics of collection are non-trivial. EV battery packs are heavy, hazardous during transport if damaged, and arrive at end-of-life in forms that vary considerably by chemistry and format. Building reliable collection networks — including OEM take-back schemes, leasing arrangements that retain manufacturer ownership through the battery lifecycle, and municipally-organised electronics collection — is itself an infrastructure problem. It is also the stage where most recycled cobalt is currently lost, not through processing inefficiency but through batteries simply not entering the formal recycling system.

From collection, batteries move to pre-processing: discharge to safe voltage levels, sorting by chemistry, and partial or full dismantling of the pack structure. This stage remains labour-intensive and is often performed manually, particularly for non-standard battery formats. The economics here are under-appreciated: pre-processing cost is a material determinant of whether recycling a given battery type is financially viable, and it varies significantly by cell format and pack design.

Pre-processed batteries then undergo mechanical processing — typically shredding or crushing under controlled conditions — to produce what the industry calls black mass: a fine, dark powder containing cobalt, nickel, manganese, lithium, graphite, and residual electrolyte. Black mass is the primary traded intermediate in the battery recycling value chain, and it is where economics and geopolitics intersect uncomfortably. China currently has the largest installed base of black mass processing capacity, and Chinese buyers have historically offered competitive prices for black mass feedstock from European and American recyclers — meaning that secondary material often flows east before being refined and returned as cathode precursors. Addressing that dynamic is a central concern of both the EU’s Battery Regulation and the US Inflation Reduction Act.

Refining is the technically demanding stage that separates the metals within black mass. Two routes exist. Pyrometallurgy — high-temperature smelting — recovers cobalt and nickel as an alloy but loses lithium and manganese, produces slag requiring further treatment, and is energy intensive. Hydrometallurgy is increasingly the preferred industrial approach: the black mass is leached in dilute sulphuric acid, dissolving the valuable metals into solution, which is then processed through solvent extraction and selective precipitation to isolate cobalt sulphate, nickel sulphate, lithium carbonate, and manganese compounds as separate streams. Hydrometallurgical processes now achieve 95–99% recovery rates for cobalt and nickel, and 85–95% for lithium, making them substantially more resource-efficient than the pyrometallurgical alternative.

The refined cobalt sulphate then enters precursor cathode active material (pCAM) production, where it is combined with nickel and manganese sulphates in controlled ratios to produce the precursor compounds used in cathode manufacturing. This is the highest-value stage in the recycling chain and, currently, one of the most geographically concentrated — again, in China. The final stage, cathode active material (CAM) production and its re-entry into cell manufacturing, completes the loop. At full efficiency, cobalt recovered from an end-of-life battery can be back in a new cell within roughly twelve months. At current infrastructure maturity, the actual cycle is considerably longer.

The Policy Ratchet

Regulation is now applying meaningful pressure to each stage of this chain, and the timelines are not theoretical.

The EU’s Battery Regulation (Regulation 2023/1542), which entered force in 2023, establishes binding targets that become progressively more demanding. By end-2027, recyclers operating in the EU must achieve 90% material recovery for cobalt, copper, lead, and nickel. That rises to 95% by end-2031. More consequentially for the economics of the value chain, the regulation mandates minimum recycled content in new batteries: 16% cobalt by 2031, rising to 26% by 2036. These requirements create a compliance-driven floor of demand for verified recycled cobalt that does not currently exist in the market. They also create a premium for cobalt that can be traced through a certified EU supply chain  a premium that battery-grade recycled cobalt from domestically-based refiners is well positioned to capture.

The EU Critical Raw Materials Act, alongside the Battery Regulation, designates cobalt a strategic raw material and sets a target of sourcing 25% of EU strategic raw material consumption from recycling by 2030. These two instruments together are creating a regulatory architecture designed to pull investment into European refining and pCAM capacity — the stages of the value chain that currently leak value to China.

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act’s Critical Mineral Tax Credits have begun to incentivise domestic battery material production, and cobalt’s long-standing position on the US Critical Minerals List means it qualifies for the full suite of associated federal support. The practical effect has been to accelerate investment in domestic hydrometallurgical capacity, though significant scale has yet to arrive.

What the Numbers Actually Show

The headline recycling rate for cobalt looks encouraging: approximately 68% of cobalt in batteries is recovered at end-of-life globally, placing it well above lithium and manganese on that metric. The important caveat is that this figure reflects recovery rates in established markets with mature collection infrastructure primarily Europe, Japan, and South Korea  and that the first large cohort of end-of-life EV battery packs is only beginning to move through the system in meaningful volumes. The recycling infrastructure being built today will process the batteries sold in 2018–2022; the batteries being sold now will stress a recycling system that, by 2030, will need to handle volumes an order of magnitude larger.

The IEA estimates that under ambitious recycling scenarios, secondary cobalt could meet approximately 30% of demand by 2035. Under current trajectories, the figure is closer to 10–15%. The gap between those two outcomes is not primarily a question of processing technology  the chemistry is understood and the recovery rates achievable by hydrometallurgy are already high. It is a question of collection infrastructure, refining capacity, and supply chain traceability. All three are engineering and logistics problems that yield to capital, policy continuity, and time.

The global black mass recycling market, which provides the clearest market signal for this activity, was valued at approximately $16.8 billion in 2025 and is projected to reach $84 billion by 2035, growing at a CAGR of 17.6%. Among the major operators, Umicore held over 15% market share in the battery recycling sector in 2025, with a 150,000-tonne European facility in development. Glencore’s August 2025 acquisition of Li-Cycle, which had built a significant North American spoke-and-hub collection and black mass production network, brought major primary mining capital directly into the recycling value chain — a signal worth noting. Redwood Materials reported 95%+ critical material recovery rates from its South Carolina facility in late 2025, demonstrating that domestic US hydrometallurgical processing at scale is achievable.

Why This Matters for Manufacturers and Investors

The cobalt recycling value chain is not a peripheral sustainability consideration. It is becoming a compliance requirement, a cost management tool, and a competitive differentiator simultaneously.

For EV manufacturers and battery producers with EU market exposure, the 2031 recycled content mandates are a procurement planning horizon, not a distant aspiration. Securing offtake agreements with EU-based refiners or investing in closed-loop arrangements with recycling partners now is the approach that avoids a scramble for compliant material in five years. For manufacturers relying on Chinese-refined cobalt sulphate — which is most of them the regulatory direction of travel on content traceability and sourcing geography is clear, and repositioning supply chains takes time that is already running short.

For investors, the value chain analysis points to specific bottlenecks where capital is most needed and most differentiated. Collection logistics and pre-processing remain fragmented and underinvested relative to the volumes that will arrive within this decade. Hydrometallurgical refining capacity outside China is the single largest gap in the Western recycling chain it is the stage that determines whether black mass becomes a domestically-refined strategic asset or a feedstock export. And pCAM production in the US and EU is almost entirely absent at the scale required by the Battery Regulation’s 2031 targets.

The recycled cobalt market is projected to grow from $1.46 billion in 2024 to $4.72 billion by 2034. That trajectory is underpinned by regulation, by supply scarcity in the primary market, and by the straightforward economics of a metal that produces 80% less greenhouse gas when recycled than when mined and refined from ore.

What to Watch

Three dynamics will determine whether the cobalt recycling value chain develops quickly enough to matter for the current energy transition cycle.

First, the pace of collection infrastructure deployment in the US and EU. The first-generation EV fleets are entering end-of-life now. Whether those batteries are captured by domestic recyclers or exported as black mass to Asia will shape secondary supply availability for the next decade. Policy instruments  extended producer responsibility schemes, OEM take-back mandates, infrastructure co-investment exist to accelerate this, but implementation is uneven and enforcement is nascent.

Second, the investment trajectory in Western hydrometallurgical refining capacity. Glencore’s acquisition of Li-Cycle and Redwood’s South Carolina facility suggest that the capital is beginning to move. But the gap between current capacity and what the EU Battery Regulation’s 2031 targets imply is substantial, and the facilities that need to be operational by 2031 need to be under construction within the next two to three years.

Third, the stability of DRC primary supply. Cobalt at $56,000 per tonne makes recycling economics more attractive than at $21,000. But the price signal that makes secondary cobalt compelling is itself evidence of a primary supply system under stress. If DRC export controls tighten further, or if sovereign risk events disrupt major Chinese-operated mines, the recycled supply chain that is still being built will be the only available response. Building it before that scenario arrives is considerably easier than building it during one.

The battery in the next generation of electric vehicles will, if policy succeeds, contain cobalt that was in a previous battery. The infrastructure to make that happen is being assembled now. The window for Western manufacturers and investors to position themselves inside that value chain rather than outside it, buying from whoever builds it first is measured in years, not decades

Lesley Blaine

Lesley Blaine

CEO Hatch Oxford

Copper – The Metal Underneath Everything

Copper has been formally designated a critical mineral on both sides of the Atlantic. Has the cleantech world noticed? It should.

Copper hit $14,200 a tonne today up 9% since January. But the more important story isn’t the price. It’s where the metal actually comes from, what that means for the energy transition, and why the people building the infrastructure of the next decade are largely unaware that two of the world’s largest economies have formally classified it as strategically critical.

A Quietly Significant Policy Moment

In November 2025, the United States added copper to its Critical Minerals List for the first time, published in the Federal Register on 7 November. The EU moved earlier: the Critical Raw Materials Act, which came into force in May 2024, designated copper a strategic raw material with binding legal force the first time such a designation carried enforceable policy weight in Europe.

Both designations unlock meaningful consequences: expedited federal permitting under FAST-41 in the US, Defence Production Act funding, significant tax incentives, and strategic project status in Europe. Freeport-McMoRan, operating seven mines across the United States, estimated potential annual tax credits exceeding $500 million from qualifying projects once copper achieved critical mineral status.

The coverage of these developments was almost entirely confined to mining law blogs, resources investors, and specialist trade press. The broader innovation and cleantech ecosystem the very constituency most exposed to copper supply risk largely missed it.

The Supply Map Is Uncomfortably Concentrated

Over half of all global copper reserves sit in just five countries: Chile, Australia, Peru, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Russia. Chile alone produces 23% of the world’s mined copper roughly 5.3 million metric tonnes in 2024. The DRC, politically one of the least stable jurisdictions on earth, has overtaken Peru to become the second largest producer globally, with output rising sharply on the back of Chinese-owned expansion at the Tenke, Fungurume and Kisanfu projects.

China’s position in all of this warrants close attention. It imports 60% of global copper ore and refines more than 45% of the world’s supply. It is simultaneously the world’s largest consumer, largest refiner, and a dominant investor in the mines that produce the raw material. The West, by and large, buys the finished product.

Global mine production is projected to grow just 2.1% in 2025 to approximately 23.4 million tonnes. That modest growth, against a backdrop of surging electrification demand, is already generating structural tension in the market.

America’s Growing Import Dependency

The US data is stark. Mine production fell 5% in 2025 to 1 million tonnes the lowest in recent years driven by concentrator shutdowns and declining ore grades at multiple operations. Domestic refinery output dropped 9%. Net import reliance hit 57% of apparent consumption, up from 44% just four years ago.

Arizona accounts for approximately 70% of domestic output. Refined copper imports — primarily from Chile (68%), Canada (16%), and Peru (7%) now account for 88% of all unmanufactured copper imports. The COMEX copper price averaged a record $4.80 per pound in 2025, with analysts attributing much of the increase to uncertainty around tariff implementation on copper materials.

US refined copper stocks held by producers, consumers, and metal exchanges stood at 450,000 tonnes at year-end 2025 more than three times the level of the prior year, reflecting both import surge and demand hedging.

Europe’s Structural Exposure

The EU’s position is no more comfortable. Europe imported $15.67 billion worth of copper in 2024, holds negligible primary reserves of its own, and sources refined copper predominantly from Chile, Peru, and other concentrated geographies. The recycling sector currently supplies approximately 30% of EU consumption, a figure that, while meaningful, leaves the bloc heavily exposed to primary supply dynamics.

EU copper demand is forecast to grow 1.8% in 2025 and a further 1.4% in 2026, driven entirely by electrification. The global market is already projected to run a supply deficit of approximately 150,000 tonnes in 2026, widening to over 300,000 tonnes by 2027 as demand growth outpaces primary supply expansion.

The Recycling Opportunity — and Its Limits

Copper is one of the few materials that can be recycled indefinitely without loss of quality, and the economics of recycling are compelling: recovering copper from scrap uses roughly 85% less energy than primary smelting. The global end-of-life recycling rate is currently 40%, rising to over 50% in the EU, China, and Japan.

In the US, approximately 30% of copper supply already comes from scrap. In 2025, post-consumer scrap contributed an estimated 160,000 tonnes of recovered copper, while manufacturing scrap added a further 760,000 tonnes. Brass and wire-rod mills account for around 80% of total scrap recovery.

The recycled copper market was valued at $39.59 billion in 2025 and is projected to grow at 9.3% CAGR through 2033, reaching $78.90 billion. China’s elimination of import tariffs on recycled copper in January 2025, combined with a 20-million-tonne recycled metal goal under its 14th Five-Year Plan, is creating significant new pull on global scrap flows, a dynamic that may tighten the secondary supply available to European and American manufacturers.

The recycling story is genuinely encouraging. But at current recycling rates, secondary supply cannot close the projected deficit. The global supply gap will require both accelerated recycling and new primary production and the permitting timelines for the latter are measured in decades, not years.

Why This Matters for Innovators and Investors

Every electric vehicle requires roughly four times the copper of a conventional internal combustion vehicle. Every offshore wind turbine contains between 4 and 15 tonnes of copper. Every data centre expansion chasing AI workloads adds to electrical demand that, in turn, requires copper-intensive grid infrastructure. The metal sits beneath the energy transition as a foundational dependency not a peripheral input.

For university spinouts and early-stage innovators working in electrification, mobility, energy storage, or advanced manufacturing, copper supply risk is not an abstract macro concern. It is a near-term cost pressure, a potential supply chain constraint, and increasingly a regulatory and strategic consideration that shapes where and how capital flows.

The designations on both sides of the Atlantic are, in this sense, signals worth reading carefully. They represent governments concluding independently, through different processes that the copper supply chain is vulnerable in ways that require active policy intervention. That is not a routine finding.

What to Watch

Three dynamics are worth tracking in the months ahead. First, the pace of new mine development, lead times for copper mines run 10–20 years from discovery to production, and the current project pipeline is insufficient to meet projected 2030s demand. Second, the geopolitical trajectory of DRC and Chilean production, both of which are subject to sovereign risk, royalty regime changes, and in the DRC’s case, significant Chinese ownership concentration. Third, the evolution of secondary supply in response to policy incentives particularly whether the US and EU can develop domestic recycling capacity fast enough to partially offset primary import dependence.

At $14,200 a tonne and rising, the market is already pricing some of this in. Policy has caught up. The question is whether the innovation economy follows.

Lesley Blaine

Lesley Blaine

CEO Hatch Oxford

Why most university spinouts are structurally doomed

Across multiple universities, sectors, and funding programmes, the same patterns repeat. Technologies leave the lab with strong technical foundations but enter the market with critical gaps already baked in. Regulatory pathways are assumed rather than defined. Manufacturing is deferred until funding appears. Commercial responsibility is distributed across committees, advisors, and time-limited programmes.

Everyone contributes insight. No one owns the outcome.

The valley of death is really a gap in ownership

The phrase “valley of death” has become shorthand for the period between proof-of-concept and commercial traction. The framing is not wrong, but it is incomplete. What is commonly described as a funding gap is more accurately a responsibility gap. Technologies fall into it because no individual or organisation is mandated to carry them across.

Universities are optimised to create knowledge. Funding programmes are optimised to distribute risk. Advisors are optimised to provide guidance. None of these structures are designed to carry responsibility for commercial success. When every actor is doing what they are optimised for, the venture still ends up stranded — because carrying a technology from lab to market was not in anyone’s job description.

This is not a criticism of universities, TTOs, or founders. It is a structural observation about how industrial innovation is organised.

Why the pattern repeats

The sequence is predictable. Early enthusiasm from the research team and the TTO gives way to extended timelines as the commercial case takes shape slowly. Ownership of outcomes dilutes as more advisors, committees, and funding programmes become involved. Decision-making slows because no one has both the mandate and the context to make a call.

What is missing is not effort, intelligence, or intent. It is a single point of accountability for what happens next.

This is the same problem an early-stage founder solves by the simple act of incorporating a company: the company becomes the accountable entity. Everything before incorporation — and much that happens immediately after — exists in an accountability vacuum by design.

What industrial commercialisation actually requires

Successful ventures address regulatory positioning early, not after technical validation. Manufacturing realities shape technical decisions from the outset. Commercial pathways are designed alongside development plans, not added later. Most importantly, responsibility for outcomes is clearly assigned and continuously held.

When these conditions are absent, failure is not accidental. It is predictable.

These observations are not theoretical. They come from repeated exposure to the same failure modes across different institutions, sectors, and funding environments. The details vary; the structure does not.

What this means for researchers, TTOs, and founders

For researchers, it means recognising that scientific strength alone does not build a venture. The commercial work is not downstream of the research; it shapes what the research should actually produce.

For TTOs, it means choosing deliberately between supporting many technologies at shallow depth and supporting fewer technologies with the integrated commercial discipline that industrial commercialisation requires.

For pre-spinout and spinout teams, it means asking — before incorporation, ideally — who owns the commercial outcome, what they are accountable for, and whether their capability matches the size of the job.

What Hatch exists to do

Closing the ownership gap requires more than additional programmes or better advice. It requires a different operating model — one that treats commercialisation as an integrated, accountable process rather than a sequence of hand-offs.

This is the gap Hatch exists to own.

Lesley Blaine

Lesley Blaine

CEO Hatch Oxford

How to win under Innovate UK’s new strategy

Innovate UK has changed direction. The old model of chasing a grant with a strong technical story is no longer enough.

The new strategy is aimed at building high-potential UK tech businesses, not just funding isolated R&D projects. Innovate UK is focusing on six priority sectors, backing deep tech more deliberately, and putting more emphasis on growth, investment readiness, and long-term commercial impact. That means founders need to change how they apply — and, more importantly, what they apply with.

Start with strategic fit

Make it obvious where your business sits in the market, why it matters, and how it aligns with the direction Innovate UK is taking. A clever idea on its own is not enough. The application must show that the opportunity is commercially important, that the venture can become part of something bigger, and that public money will have a measurable effect on the trajectory of a business that would otherwise be under-capitalised.

Assessors are now calibrating applications against a portfolio-level view of what Innovate UK wants the UK economy to look like. Applications that cannot connect their individual work to that picture are at an increasing disadvantage.

Get serious about the commercial case

Too many applications still lean almost entirely on the technology. That is a mistake. If you cannot explain who will buy, why they care, and what happens after the project ends, the application is weak no matter how strong the science is.

Innovate UK is signalling clearly that it wants companies that can scale, attract investment, and stay in the UK. That changes what the “commercial section” of an application is for. It is no longer a supporting document; it is the case for funding.

The commercial case should name a defined beachhead market, size it credibly, describe who buys first and why, and show how the grant-funded phase connects to the phase after it. A hand-wave toward “significant market opportunity” is worth nothing.

Be honest about stage

Innovate UK has said support will be calibrated to stage and risk, with grants and loans matched more carefully to business maturity. So the ask has to fit the evidence. Overselling readiness will hurt you. Applying too early will too.

The discipline is to know what phase the venture is genuinely in — and what phase the evidence can support — and to apply into the instrument that matches. A venture that looks over-sold against its own evidence will be flagged; one that looks under-ambitious against genuinely strong evidence will be marked down too.

Write like a business worth backing

Innovate UK is building specialist sector teams and a new support service, Velocity, to help promising businesses move from early engagement to fundraising and growth. That tells you exactly what assessors will be looking for: clarity, credibility, traction, and a believable route to scale.

Applications that read like grant applications will lose to applications that read like business cases. The distinction is not cosmetic. A grant application describes a project that will be done with money. A business case describes a venture that will be funded, of which this grant is one part.

The best applications start before the form opens

Under the new strategy, Innovate UK is less interested in funding interesting projects for their own sake. It is looking for businesses with the potential to matter.

That shifts the timeline. A good application cannot be written in two weeks from a cold start; it requires the commercial case, the business model, and the funding strategy to be aligned before the form is opened. The founders who will win under the new strategy are the ones who have done that alignment work months in advance.

What Hatch does

At Hatch, this is the work we do. We help founders align technology, commercial opportunity, and funding strategy so the Innovate UK application is not a separate exercise — it is a shorter version of the case the venture is already making to investors, partners, and customers.

Related reading: Why most university spinouts are structurally doomed

Chris Gregory

Chris Gregory

COO Hatch Oxford